Peer-reviewed publications
Praça, S., Freitas, A., & Hoepers, B. (2012). A rotatividade dos servidores de confiança no governo federal brasileiro, 2010-2011. Novos Estudos – CEBRAP, 91-107. [Publisher’s version]
Abstract: What are the determinants of turnover among political appointees in the Brazilian federal government? This article shows that a change in minister does not necessarily entail change among political appointees, although this is true for higher-level appointees with policymaking tasks. Contrary to initial expectations, we find that agencies affected by corruption scandals have lower turnover than other agencies. We argue that it is necessary to consider the policy expertise of appointees, measured as longevity in civil service, in order to understand bureaucratic turnover. Further research on political appointees and their relationships with political parties and ministers in Brazil will likely shed light on important, yet neglected, aspects of the political system.
Praça, S., Freitas, A., & Hoepers, B. (2011). Political Appointments and Coalition Management in Brazil, 2007-2010. Journal of Politics in Latin America, 3(2), 141-172. [Publisher’s version]
Abstract: Studies on coalition management in presidential systems usually focus on two types of goods used by the president and formateur party to hold together coalitions: exchange goods (such as individual budget amendments) and coalition goods (such as ministries). This research notes analyzes, with an original dataset of party members and political appointees in Brazil, a different type of good: presidential political appointments. Our study shows that partisan political appointees vary greatly among Brazilian ministries and within them. We also found that there is a disconnect between how many seats a political party holds in Congress and the number of political appointment offices it controls. This has implications for the literature on bureaucracy and politics and the literature on coalition management.
Rennó, L. R., & Hoepers, B. (2010). Voto estratégico punitivo: transferência de votos nas eleições presidenciais de 2006. Novos Estudos – CEBRAP, 141-161. [Publisher’s version]
Abstract: This article discusses voters’ electoral strategies who transferred their votes to Lula in the second round of the 2006 Brazilian presidential elections. The goal is to test the hypothesis that voters applied a new form of strategic voting in the first round of the elections: strategic punitive vote. We argue that this type of electoral behavior was decisive to explain vote choices in the 2006 presidential elections as well as the conditions for strategic voting in ballotage systems.
Policy publication
Steven E. Finkel, Christopher A. Belasco, Bruno Hoepers, Caitlin Corrigan, and Michael Neureiter (2016). Evaluating Legal Institutional Reforms in Countries with Weak Rule of Law: The Pitt Vis Moot Experience. Report submitted to the Center for International Legal Education, University of Pittsburgh.
Works in progress
- “Does Government Advertising Benefit the Incumbent Party Electorally? A Subnational Analysis in Argentina”
- “Promoting the President’s Policies: Investment in Government Advertising by the Brazilian Ministries”
- “Presidential Investment in Government Advertising and Its Eff ects in Brazil (2008-2019)”
- “Local News Deserts and their Impact on Political Participation in Brazil”
- “The Promotion Patterns to General in the Brazilian Army”.
